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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-3665 
___________ 
 
ROSA J. GONZALEZ, 
                                    Appellant 
 v. 
 
 CITY OF NORWICH CONNECTICUT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. N.J. No. 3:15-cv-05901) 
District Judge:  Honorable Freda L. Wolfson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal for Jurisdictional Defect or Summary Action  
Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
April 7, 2016 
 
Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 18, 2016) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Rosa J. Gonzalez appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failing to state a claim upon which relief could 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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be granted.  Appellee City of Norwich, Connecticut (“the City)” has moved to dismiss the 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction as untimely and has moved to summarily affirm the District 
Court’s judgment.  We disagree that the appeal is untimely but agree that it presents no 
substantial question on the merits.  Consequently, we will grant the City’s motion to 
affirm.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Gonzalez brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey asserting a claim against the City.  Although the contours of the claim are difficult 
to discern, the allegations include the statements that the City engaged in an “abuse of 
power,” that the City failed to process payments of some kind in 1995, that Gonzalez was 
wrongly charged with larceny arising out of an incident working as a translator in court in 
Norwich, and that Gonzalez was improperly jailed for five days in Connecticut.   
 The City filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for 
failure to state a claim.  Gonzalez filed a response that did not address the asserted 
grounds for the City’s motion to dismiss.  The District Court thereafter acted on its duty 
to screen a pro se complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and dismissed the 
complaint for the failure to articulate a clear basis for subject matter jurisdiction, for the 
lack of any basis to assert personal jurisdiction over the City, and for the failure to 
adequately plead any claim upon which it could grant relief.  The District Court issued its 
dismissal order on August 31, 2015, and Gonzalez filed a notice of appeal on October 28, 
2015.  Before us are the City’s motion to dismiss the appeal and to affirm the District 
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Court’s judgment, Gonzalez’s pro se informal brief, and two motions for default that 
Gonzalez has filed on appeal. 
 First, we must consider our jurisdiction to hear this appeal.  The City argues that 
the appeal is untimely because Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) required 
Gonzalez to appeal within 30 days of the District Court’s order dismissing her complaint.  
Gonzalez filed her notice of appeal 58 days after the District Court’s order.  However, the 
City has apparently disregarded Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a), which requires 
that District Courts set out their judgments in separate documents.  Under circumstances 
in which the judgment is not set out in a separate document, the time of entry of judgment 
is deemed to be when 150 days have run from the entry of judgment in the civil docket.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7).   
 Here, the District Court issued a single order on August 31, 2015, that dismissed 
Gonzalez’s complaint and explained its reasons for the dismissal.  See In re Cendant 
Corp., 454 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]n order will be treated as a separate 
document if it meets three criteria: first, the order must be self-contained and separate 
from the opinion; second, the order must note the relief granted; and third, the order must 
omit (or substantially omit) the District Court’s reasons for disposing of the parties’ 
claims.”).  Consequently, judgment was deemed entered 150 days later on January 28, 
2016.  Gonzalez’s notice of appeal was therefore timely filed on October 28, 2015. 
 Although the appeal is timely, there is no substantial question that the District 
Court was correct to dismiss Gonzalez’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction and the failure 
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to state a claim.  The complaint was subject to dismissal “if the pleading [did] not 
plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief,” and our review of that question is plenary.  
Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28, 32 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).  We will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s order if there is no substantial question presented in 
the appeal.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.    
 Here, a review of the difficult-to-parse complaint and Gonzalez’s other 
submissions shows that the complaint sets out no basis for jurisdiction in the District 
Court.  Even if the complaint perhaps arguably asserted a civil rights cause of action over 
which the District Court could have had subject matter jurisdiction in federal court, 
Gonzalez asserted no basis for personal jurisdiction over the City.  See Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. ____, ____, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (general 
jurisdiction requires that defendant corporate entities’ “affiliations with the State are so 
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”); 
Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. ____, ____, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) (specific jurisdiction 
requires that the defendant have sufficient “suit-related conduct” to “create a substantial 
connection with the forum State.”).  Here, there is no question, substantial or otherwise, 
that the City is not “essentially at home” in the District of Jersey, or that none of the 
City’s alleged conduct as set out in the complaint has any connection to New Jersey. 
 Consequently, we will grant the City’s motion to summarily affirm the District 
Court’s order dismissing Gonzalez’s complaint.  Gonzalez’s motions for default are 
dismissed as moot.   
